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Sandro Brusco's Mug ShotProfessor and Chair, Department of Economics, State University of New York at Stony Brook, USA

Main Topics: Mechanism Design; Auctions and Trading Mechanisms; Corporate Finance; Political Economy;fiscal federalism and electoral systems.

Professional Profile: Sandro Brusco is Professor of Economics at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, where he is currently Director of the Department of Economics.
His research interests mainly concern the theory of mechanism design and its applications. In particular, from the applications of the theory point of view, he worked on optimal design of auctions and sales mechanisms and issues of public finance and political science, especially fiscal federalism and electoral systems.
In addition to his academic work he is the founder and editor of the blog and collaborates with Linkiesta and Il Fatto Quotidiano. Together with Alberto Bisin, Michele Boldrin, Andrea Moro and Giulio Zanella he has published the book Tremonti. Istruzioni per il disuso, Ancora del Mediteranneo, Napoli, 2010.


  • B.A. in Economics, Bocconi University Milan, 1986
  • Ph.D. in Economic Analysis and Policy, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1992



Selected Works:
  • The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting (with J. Roy and M. Dziubinski), Games and Economic Behavior, (2012), 74 (2): 447--469
  • The Economics of Contingent Re-auctions (with G. Lopomo and L. Marx), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2011), 3(2): 165--93
  • Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard and Financial Contagion, (with F. Castiglionesi), Journal of Finance, (2007) LXII (5): 2275-2302
  • Perfect Bayesian Implementation in Economic Environments, Journal of Economic Theory, (2006) 129: 1-30
  • Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities" (with G. Lopomo), Review of Economic Studies (2002) 69: 407-436
  • The Optimal Design of a Market (with M. Jackson), Journal of Economic Theory, (1999) 88: 1-39